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Abstract
We investigate firms’ alliance design choices by examining alliances as multifaceted
contractual forms.  The analysis explores the contractual heterogeneity underlying alternative
governance structures for alliances, the bundling of different contractual provisions, and the
dimensionality of the contractual completeness construct.  The empirical evidence indicates
that the complexity of collaborative agreements – in terms of the number and stringency of
provisions – is greater for alliances that are strategically important and that involve high
levels of asset specificity.  Factor analysis of tetrachoric correlations among eight contractual
provisions reveals two distinct dimensions of contractual completeness.  Partners with prior
collaborative relationships tend to institute fewer contractual provisions for monitoring and
control of an alliance.  Relative to open-ended contractual agreements, time-bound alliances
tend  to  rely  less  heavily  on  such  provisions,  but  more  so  on  safeguards  concerning
confidential  and  proprietary  information,  alliance  termination,  and  the  adjudication  of
disputes by third parties. 
Keywords: alliance  design,  governance  structures,  collaborative  agreements,  alliance
termination.
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Introduction
During the last three decades, many taxonomies of strategic alliances have been
developed (e.g., Hamel, 1991; Hennart, 1988; Killing, 1983). While there currently is no
consensus on an alliance taxonomy for either theory development or testing, a common,
convenient,  and  theoretically-meaningful  way  of  capturing  the  underlying  differences  in
collaborative  agreements  is  to  separate  equity  alliances  and  nonequity  alliances.  This
partition reflects the categorization of alliances in general as hybrid organizational forms
(Williamson, 1991) and a desire to array different forms of alliances along the governance
continuum in a parsimonious fashion (e.g., Chi, 1994; Hennart, 1993).
The view that these two classes of alliances represent distinct governance structures
has contributed to advancements in the alliance literature, but also carries some limitations
for theory and practice. Most importantly, focusing on alliances as governance structures
obscures  the  substantial  contractual  heterogeneity  that  exists  within  each  governance
structure and the potentially unique determinants of governance structures and contractual
arrangements (James, 2000). To be sure, the discrete governance mode utilized by firms in an
alliance  is  a  helpful  way  of  encapsulating  the  mechanisms  that  incentivize  and  control
interfirm exchanges. However, within a given governance structure, parties have considerable
latitude in allocating duties, risks, procedures, and so forth through individual contractual
provisions that determine exchanges in more precise terms. These contractual terms may help
firms devise remedies for foreseeable contingencies or design processes for unforeseeable
outcomes (Poppo and Zenger, 2002). Thus, firms’ alliance design alternatives are far more
numerous and complex than depicted by the equity/nonequity dichotomy.  
In this paper, our main objective is to offer a more fine-grained investigation into
firms’ alliance design decisions by focusing on alliances as multifaceted contractual forms.
We do so by collecting and examining primary data on firms’ usage of eight different types of
contractual provisions in collaborative agreements. These provisions appearing in alliance
contracts range from notification and auditing rights to obligations concerning proprietary
information to clauses for termination and for the resolution of disputes.  Open questions that
we seek to address relate to firms’ adoption of these various provisions in alliance contracts;
the dimensionality of the contractual completeness, or contractual complexity, construct used
in prior research on alliances and outsourcing (Parkhe, 1993; Poppo and Zenger, 2002); and
the theoretical determinants of the contractual structures of strategic alliances.The remainder of the paper is organized as follows:  In the next section, we develop a
series  of  hypotheses  regarding  the  determinants  of  contractual  completeness  in  strategic
alliances. We then provide details on the research design, and the empirical results follow.
Exploratory factor analysis of tetrachoric correlations among the eight contractual provisions
uncovers two distinct dimensions of contractual completeness:  One relates to the specification
of commitments concerning proprietary and confidential information, alliance termination, and
dealings with third parties to resolve disputes (for example, extra-alliance commitments), and
the other concerns rights to reports of relevant transactions, notification rights for departures
from the agreement, and auditing rights (for example, monitoring and control). 
After exploring the incidence of various contractual provisions and the nature of
their bundling, we present multivariate results on their antecedents.  We find that firms tend
to negotiate more complex contracts in terms of the number and stringency of provisions
when  the  alliance  is  of  strategic  importance  and  when  firms  make  transaction-specific
investments in the collaborative agreement. Firms lacking prior collaborative relationships
with one another tend to rely more heavily on provisions concerning the monitoring and
control of the alliance, yet prior alliances between the parties do not appear to influence the
other dimension of contractual completeness. When alliance contracts are time-bound rather
than open-ended, firms tend to use provisions for monitoring and control less frequently, but
are  more  apt  to  specify  rights  and  obligations  concerning  proprietary  information,  the
termination of the agreement, and the adjudication of disputes by third parties. We conclude
with  a  discussion  of  the  implications  of  these  findings  and  potential  avenues  for  future
research on firms’ alliance design alternatives. 
Theory and hypotheses
The content of alliance contracts and the processes by which firms codify their
intents for an alliance into a binding agreement serve several important functions.  As one
example, parties to an alliance use the contract to set forth their mutual rights and obligations
through the specification of inputs to the alliance, processes by which exchanges will occur
and any disputes will be resolved, and expected outputs from the joint undertaking. The
alliance contract establishes the scope of the collaboration as well as a division of labor by
detailing  partners’  individual  roles  and  responsibilities.  It  also  lays  out  constraints  and
obligations external to the alliance proper.  For instance, before the alliance is operational,
firms can limit information disclosures. During the operation of the alliance, the contract
may specify how the parties will interact with third parties, whether other divisions of the
firms, alternative suppliers, or the court system. The contract can also specify the way in
which the alliance will end, firms’ subsequent claims on intellectual property, and possible
limitations  on  firms’  competitive  and  hiring  practices  through  noncompete  and
nonsolicitation agreements, respectively.
Regardless of the number or stringency of provisions firms embed in their alliance
contracts,  such  agreements  will  inevitably  be  incomplete.    Invariably  partners  will  not
foresee all potential contingencies or the most appropriate responses to them.  Even if it were
theoretically possible for a firm to design a complete alliance agreement, the negotiation and
crafting of such a contract would involve substantial direct and opportunity costs. The task
for  managers,  therefore,  is  to  weigh  these  costs  against  the  potential  benefits  of  more
complex, or complete, alliance contracts. In the subsections that follow, we develop four
hypotheses that consider the relative benefits of developing more complex alliance contracts.
2Strategic Importance of the Alliance
The  changing  characteristics  of  collaborative  agreements  over  time  suggest  that
alliances are becoming more central to firms’ strategies.  These changes also indicate why
firms might find it worthwhile to design more complex alliance contracts.  Several decades
ago, the prototypical alliance was an equity joint venture by a multinational corporation
(MNC)  into  a  developing  country,  involving  a  one-way  transfer  of  technology  from  the
MNC to the local affiliate. The MNC may have formed the joint venture outside the firm’s
core business, and the firm likely invested in the alliance primarily, if not solely, for the
purposes of accessing the local market and responding to the local government’s restrictions
on foreign direct investment (e.g., Stopford and Wells, 1972). Many alliances today continue
to have these or similar features. For some large firms investing in alliances, particularly
when  in  an  opportunistic  manner,  the  impact  of  collaborative  agreements  on  the  firm’s
profits,  learning,  or  overall  competitive  position  may  be  barely  discernible  to  senior
managers. Some of the fabled alliances that have partners agreeing to collaborate on the
basis of a handshake following a spontaneous meeting in an airport lounge likely fall into
this category. 
Increasingly,  however,  alliances  are  between  actual  or  potential  competitors,
involve  two-way  knowledge  transfers,  have  global  market  aspirations,  and  rely  on
considerably more complex deal structures in terms of the number of partners or auxiliary
collaborative agreements (e.g., Gomes-Casseres, 1996). In short, the ‘strategic’ adjective has
become more appropriate over time.  As a reflection of these changes, firms are adopting a
more  disciplined  means  of  capturing  and  sharing  best  practices  as  well  as  formalizing
alliance  procedures  for  selecting  partners  and  negotiating  collaborative  agreements  (e.g.,
Harbison and Pekar, 1998). With the increasing strategic importance of alliances as well as
the increasing share of profits and revenues attributable to alliances, some firms have also
implemented positions or functions dedicated to the formation and management of strategic
alliances (e.g., Kale, Dyer, and Singh, 2002).
We predict that firms will tend to utilize more complete contracts in alliances of
greater  strategic  importance,  for  several  reasons.  Such  alliances  will  tend  to  involve
considerably more downside risk than more peripheral or exploratory initiatives (Koza and
Lewin, 1998). Singh and Mitchell (1996) report that firms have an elevated risk of failure
after alliances dissolve or a partner forges new relationships with others.  In light of these
and other risks, the firm has an incentive to specify the scope of the alliance and to clarify
rights and obligations concerning what is outside of the immediate scope of the alliance
(e.g., confidential information) as well as what is produced during the time span of the
collaboration  (e.g.,  proprietary  technology)  (e.g.,  Borys  and  Jemison,  1989).    Parties
negotiating alliances that are strategically important are also more likely to invest in thinking
through and specifying the way the alliance will end (e.g., through dissolution, buyout of the
venture, etc.) in order to mitigate the risk of creating or shoring up a competitor’s resources
or having strategic assets fall into the hands of a third party (Branstetter and Sakakibara,
2002; Khanna, Gulati, and Nohria, 1998).  
On the process side, strategically salient alliances will tend to be more actively
monitored  by  senior  managers,  both  during  the  formation  stage  and  during  the
implementation  of  the  relationship.  Parties  are  therefore  more  apt  to  set  forth  the
mechanisms facilitating the control of the alliance (e.g., notification and auditing rights,
reporting, etc.), the means by which disputes will be resolved (e.g., arbitration provisions,
lawsuits, etc.), and ways in which the alliance’s development will be managed (Doz, 1996;
3Ring and Van de Ven, 1994).  The fact that more individuals are likely to be involved in the
establishment  and  negotiation  of  a  strategically  important  alliance  also  suggests  that
contracts  for  such  collaborative  agreements  will  have  a  natural  tendency  to  be  more
complex.  For all of these reasons, firms will tend to find it worthwhile to bear the costs of
negotiating provisions into strategically important alliances in order to ensure the desired
direct and indirect outcomes from the collaboration.  We therefore hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1: The contractual completeness of an alliance will be positively related to the
strategic importance of the alliance.
Transaction-Specific Investments
Even for an alliance that is not central to a firm’s strategy, many different types of
problems can arise for a firm due to challenges such as monitoring difficulties, disruptions to
the alliance, unforeseen contingencies, and threats to terminate the agreement.  The costs and
performance losses that ensue may be less problematic when the resources a firm contributes
to an alliance can be efficiently redeployed to other relationships or businesses.  When this is
not the case, however, partner identity begins to matter a great deal (Williamson, 1991), and
the firm must devote more effort to design an alliance to be able to mitigate the effects of
these  contractual  hazards  with  a  particular  exchange  partner  (e.g.,  Klein,  Crawford,  and
Alchian, 1978).
Transaction cost theory asserts that firms will choose a level of completeness, or
complexity, in their alliance contracts that corresponds with the level of exchange hazards.
This expresses transaction cost theory’s fundamental tenet of ‘discriminating alignment,’
which argues that firms should align governance mechanisms with the hazards of exchange
in  order  to  achieve  efficiency.  This  principle  holds  both  within  the  bounds  of  a  given
governance  structure  as  well  as  across  governance  structures  when  firms  make  discrete
structural choices in the form of vertical integration and outsourcing (e.g., Joskow, 1988;
Williamson, 1985).  
Transaction  cost  theory  therefore  considers  the  tradeoffs  between  the  costs  of
implementing  safeguards  in  alliance  contracts  with  the  costs  of  failing  to  do  so.  More
specifically, the theory suggests that to the degree that exchange hazards are low, managers
can avoid the costs of negotiating complicated contracts that detail potential contingencies,
parties’ responses to them, and a framework for resolving disputes.  Conversely, the theory
suggests that firms will only seek to bear such costs when the consequences of exchange
hazards  become  significant  (Williamson,  1991).  The  costs  of  instituting  safeguards  into
alliance contracts become worthwhile to bear when such safeguards act to reduce the costs
and performance losses from exchange hazards (e.g., Macneil, 1978; Heide, 1994). In the
alliance  context,  for  instance,  Parkhe  (1993)  reports  that  perceptions  of  opportunistic
behavior lead firms to negotiate more contractual safeguards into their alliance contracts.
Prior research on contractual completeness argues and finds that asset specificity is
an important contractual attribute affecting contract design (e.g., Joskow, 1988; Poppo and
Zenger, 2002).  When firms make transaction-specific investments in an alliance, the partner
can threaten to terminate the alliance, which would result in the firm giving up the value of
specialized assets.  Faced with such threats, managers must therefore weigh the value losses
they would experience from hold-up behavior with the costs of negotiating safeguards into
their alliance contracts ex ante. As the potential value loss increases with transaction-specific
4investment, managers will find it beneficial to negotiate more complex contracts to cover the
consequences of breach and termination as well as the processes by which such threats will
be handled.  For example, partners can specify rights to first refusal on a joint venture’s
shares,  ownership  on  intellectual  property,  the  means  by  which  an  alliance  will  be
terminated,  whether  a  buyout  price  is  set  ex  ante  or  determined  ex  post  by  third  party
appraisal, and so forth. By specifying the consequences of breaches to the agreement or
termination, parties can exchange hostages that promote the continuance of the collaborative
agreement.  Firms can also spell out in the alliance contract the processes by which disputes
will  be  resolved  internally  or  adjudicated  by  third  parties  (e.g.,  Williamson,  1983).  We
therefore predict:
Hypothesis 2:  The contractual completeness of an alliance will be positively related to
asset specificity.
Prior Ties
Although the previous hypotheses take up relevant characteristics of an alliance and
how  they  influence  the  contractual  provisions  that  firms  adopt  for  a  collaborative
arrangement, firms’ decisions regarding alliances’ contractual forms will also likely reflect
partners’  collaborative  histories.  For  example,  research  that  examines  the  functioning  of
relational contracts and the court system suggests that repeated exchanges between firms
induce cooperation since the possibility of breaking off relations serves as a self-enforcing
sanction against deviations from an agreement (e.g., Telser, 1980).  Well-functioning courts,
by contrast, are helpful in encouraging firms to invest in relationships with new exchange
partners  and  support  them  with  formal  contractual  provisions  (Johnson,  McMillan,  and
Woodruff, 2002).
Prior  research  has  emphasized  that  trust  emerges  from  successive  collaborative
relationships  between  firms,  which  leads  them  to  institute  less  extensive  governance
mechanisms  in  future  alliances.  Gulati  (1995),  for  instance,  shows  that  firms  with  prior
collaborative  agreements  tend  to  choose  nonequity  alliances  over  equity  alliances  (c.f.,
Oxley, 1997). By contrast, the more elaborate control and incentive alignment features of
equity alliances become more attractive when prior ties are absent.  Such ties also serve to
promote stability in collaborative agreements between firms (Kogut, 1989).  In an analysis of
Japanese  automakers’  networks,  Dyer  (1997)  suggests  that  these  firms  have  lower
transaction costs than their U.S. counterparts because they engage in repeated exchanges.
The noncontractual safeguards they use (e.g., goodwill trust) are efficient because the firms
have  already  invested  in  relationship  building  and  have  borne  governance  set-up  costs,
which would not be the case for alternative safeguards such as contractual provisions and
various hostages (e.g., Klein, 1980).  Related evidence from data on buyer-supplier relations
indicates that interorganizational trust reduces alliance negotiation costs (Zaheer, McEvily,
and Perrone, 1998).
We submit that if prior collaborative relationships do not exist between firms, it
might also be worthwhile for the partners to negotiate more complex alliance contracts.
Absent a collaborative history, partners will be more willing to bear contracting costs to
enhance  their  monitoring  and  control  of  the  alliance  through  reporting  provisions,
notification  procedures,  and  auditing  rights.    Moreover,  given  significant  behavioral
uncertainty,  partners  will  devote  more  attention  to  clauses  concerning  proprietary
technology, confidential information, the possible termination of the alliance, and the use of
5third parties to adjudicate any disputes that arise (e.g., Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruff,
2002).  This prediction also is in accord with prior empirical findings on contract design and
the role of firms’ reputations.  In an analysis of pricing provisions in procurement contracts
for Air Force aircraft engines, Crocker and Reynolds (1993) find that firms with records of
acting  opportunistically  have  more  complete  contracts  than  firms  known  to  fulfill  their
obligations to partners.
Beyond facilitating interorganizational trust, prior strategic alliances between firms
can lead to the development of routines that also lessen the need to detail monitoring and
control  mechanisms  and  to  institute  other  safeguards.  As  firms  enter  into  successive
collaborative agreements with each other, partners develop a better understanding of each
other’s procedures, management systems, cultures, and so forth.  By engaging in sequential
alliances, partners might tacitly develop a set of routines, and additional alliances allow
firms to reinforce and refine them. The mutual understanding that develops can help firms
mitigate coordination, conflict resolution, or information gathering problems and can thereby
facilitate  partners’  iterative  learning  and  adjustment  cycles  rather  than  being  wedded  to
contractual terms (Doz, 1996).  Dyer and Singh (1998) suggest that the relationship-specific
knowledge  that  develops  from  frequent  and  intense  partner  interactions  builds  a  firm’s
relational  capabilities,  which  can  enhance  the  efficiency  of  alliances.  Whether  prior
collaborative relationships between firms enhance the development of interorganizational
trust  and/or  routines,  we  predict  that  prior  collaborative  agreements  between  firms  will
reduce the number and stringency of provisions that firms rely upon in a future alliance: 
Hypothesis 3: The contractual completeness of an alliance will be negatively related to the
number of prior alliances between the partners.
Time Boundedness
Partners’ choices on the provisions to incorporate into an alliance agreement will
not only reflect their history of collaborative relationships with each other, but also their
expectations  for  the  evolution  of  the  alliance  (Parkhe,  1993).  For  example,  some
collaborative  agreements  will  be  open-ended  in  duration,  much  like  hierarchical
organizational forms, and other alliances will be narrower in scope, designed to operate for a
pre-specified length of time (Williamson, 1991).  
We suspect that these choices will affect the contractual provisions that firms embed
in  their  alliance  contracts  for  several  reasons.  First,  partners  that  negotiate  explicit  time
bounds  on  their  alliances  are  simply  more  likely  to  be  cognizant  of  concerns  such  as
ownership of proprietary technology, disclosures of confidential information, and the means
by which the alliance will end. Second, for time-bound alliances, it is easier to predict the
relevant contingencies that might affect the alliance. By contrast, the costs of predicting
future economic conditions for open-ended alliances and crafting appropriate contractual
provisions  will  be  significant,  so  firms  will  tend  to  rely  more  heavily  on  incomplete
agreements under these circumstances (Crocker & Reynolds, 1993). Finally, alliances that
have a pre-specified duration may experience an increased risk of partner opportunism. For
time-bound  alliances,  partners  are  less  able  to  rely  on  tit-for-tat  responses  to  keep
opportunism in check (Axelrod, 1984). Conversely, in open-ended alliances, potential gains
from future collaboration safeguard the alliance from a partner defecting to obtain more
proximate payoffs (Telser, 1980). We therefore hypothesize:
6Hypothesis 4: The contractual completeness of an alliance will be greater for time-bound
alliances than open-ended collaborative relationships.
Methods
Data
Sample. In order to identify a population of collaborative agreements to target for
this study, we used Funk and Scott’s Countries Index – Europe to find Spanish firms forming
strategic alliances. Financial constraints and the fact that one of the authors lives in Spain led
us to focus on Spanish firms engaged in interfirm collaboration. This focus also facilitated
the follow-up process, thereby increasing the odds of obtaining a satisfactory response rate.
We  identified  firms  engaging  in  674  dyadic  alliances,  but  due  to  time  and  financial
considerations, we focused the data collection efforts on industries more active in alliances,
which yielded a target population of 436 alliances formed by 346 firms. Questionnaires were
sent  out  to  the  firms  in  which  a  key  informant  directly  related  to  the  alliance  could  be
identified. Of the 189 surveys mailed, 91 responses were obtained, representing a 48 percent
response  rate.  The  high  response  rate  may  be  attributed  to  the  steps  taken  to  locate
appropriate  respondents,  the  follow-up  procedure  of  making  supplemental  phone  calls
(Dillman, 1978), and guarantees of confidentiality and access to the study’s findings. As an
illustration of the competence and appropriateness of key informants, 91 percent had been
involved since the formation of the collaborative agreement, and on average respondents had
been involved with the alliance for 4.9 years. Usable data were available for 88 strategic
alliances.
Survey instrument. Preliminary  versions  of  the  questionnaire  were  reviewed  by
business scholars to ensure face validity. The survey was then translated into Spanish and
reviewed by two Spanish-speaking researchers. The translated survey was pre-tested with six
Spanish executives experienced in managing alliances, and several changes were made after
the pre-testing stage. The final Spanish version was then reverse translated into English by a
person unfamiliar with the study, and there was a high degree of correspondence between the
Spanish and English versions.
We performed a number of tests to assess the validity of the data. First, to examine
the  data’s  external  validity,  we  examined  secondary  data  sources  for  information
corresponding to the survey items. In particular, we assessed whether or not the responding
firm is state-owned and whether the partner firm is a Spanish company, a subsidiary, or a
foreign company, and we found matches for 98 and 96 percent of the cases, respectively. 
Second,  in  order  to  assess  potential  nonresponse  bias,  we  tested  for  possible
differences between early and late respondents, on the assumption that late respondents are
more similar to non-respondents than early respondents are to non-respondents (Armstrong
and Overton, 1977). In particular, we tested for differences in firm size based on number of
employees, and we examined the sectoral distribution of alliances. A one-way analysis of
variance (ANOVA) for firm size across early and late respondents yielded an insignificant F-
value of 0.67. Chi-square values comparing the sectoral distribution of alliances for early
and late respondents and for respondents and non-respondents were similarly insignificant
(i.e., 8.54 and 13.52, respectively), again providing no evidence of nonresponse bias. 
7Finally, although our dependent variables are objective indicators of the contractual
provisions that firms put into their alliance agreements, we addressed the possibility that
consistency  artifacts  and  common  methods  bias  may  influence  our  models.  Beyond
arranging  questionnaire  items  so  that  subjective  items  appear  prior  to  questions  on  the
contractual design and governance of alliances (e.g., Salancik and Pfeffer, 1977), we used
Harman’s  (1967)  single-factor  test  to  assess  whether  a  significant  amount  of  common
variance exists in the data (e.g., Podsakoff and Organ, 1986). Unrotated factor analysis using
the eigenvalue-greater-than-one criterion revealed four factors, and the first factor explained
only 21.0 percent of the variance in the data, indicating that the results presented in the next
section cannot be attributed to common methods bias.
Model Specification and Measures
Model specification. The  basic  structure  of  the  different  models,  which  test  the
factors associated with the degree of contractual completeness in strategic alliances, is as
follows: 
[1] Contractual completeness = β 0 + β 1Strategic importance + β 2Asset specificity 
+ β 3Prior ties + β 4Time bound+ β 5Firm size +β 6Foreign 
+ β 7Equity + ε .
Contractual completeness. Contractual provisions in alliances and other types of
contracts have been studied and measured in various ways. Some research has relied upon
global measures of the complexity of contracts. For instance, recently Poppo and Zenger
(2002) have followed Macneil (1978) in asking key informants to rate the degree to which
the parties created a complex contract to deal with future contingencies. Similarly, Joskow
(1988) used contract length as a proxy for the complexity of an agreement. Other studies, by
contrast, have examined very specific details of agreements or the provisions which parties
institute into their contracts. For example, prior research has investigated the causes and
consequences of territorial restraints in licensing agreements (e.g., Mueller and Geithman,
1991), of up-front fees and royalty rates in franchising agreements (Lafontaine, 1992), of
contract  duration  in  supply  agreements  (e.g.,  Joskow,  1987),  and  of  specific  pricing
provisions in procurement contracts (Crocker and Reynolds, 1993).
In this study, we utilize a series of indicators of contractual provisions that can also
be  aggregated  to  form  a  global  measure  of  the  complexity  of  alliance  contracts.  The
provisions which we focus on were highlighted in a study by Parkhe (1993). Specifically, he
developed a checklist of contractual safeguards obtained from a computer-assisted search of
the legal literature (e.g., Macneil, 1978, 1981; Narasimhan, 1989; Practicing Law Institute,
1986)  and  documented  the  following  eight  provisions:  1)  periodic  written  reports  of  all
relevant transactions, 2) prompt written notice of any departures from the agreement, 3) the
right to examine and audit all relevant records through a firm of CPAs, 4) designation of
certain information as proprietary and subject to confidentiality provisions of the contract, 5)
non-use of proprietary information even after termination of agreement, 6) termination of
agreement,  7)  arbitration  clauses,  and  8)  lawsuit  provisions.  These  items  are  arrayed  in
increasing order of stringency, so a weighting scheme can be adopted to arrive at a global
measure of contractual completeness, as follows:







=where Di equals i if the ith provision was employed, and zero otherwise (Parkhe, 1993). In
other words, Di equals one if the first provision was employed, zero otherwise; two if the
second provision was employed, zero otherwise; and so on. The summation term therefore
ranges from 0 to 36, and the division by 36 yields a measure ranging from zero to one. When
the variable takes on a value of zero, none of the eight provisions listed above are in place.
When the variable assumes its maximum value of one, all of the eight provisions appear in
the alliance agreement.
Use of this proxy for contractual completeness can effectively be seen as a joint test
for  the  weighting  scheme  employed  and  for  the  unidimensionality  of  the  contractual
completeness construct. As a consequence, in order to explore the robustness of our results
and in an attempt to disentangle these auxiliary assumptions, two additional types of analysis
were performed. First, we constructed the multivariate models using an unweighted measure
of contractual completeness as the dependent variable. This alternative measure allows us to
examine if the effects of the individual covariates remained significant or insignificant when
the contractual provisions were instead assumed to be equivalent in stringency. This measure
for contractual completeness was calculated as follows:
[3] Contractual completeness (unweighted) = 
where Xi equals 1 if the ith provision was employed, and zero otherwise. The summation
ranges  from  zero  to  eight,  and  specifications  reliant  on  this  dependent  variable  were
therefore estimated using ordered logit models.
Second, we examined the dimensionality of the construct using exploratory factor
analysis. A problem arises, however, because the contractual provision dummies violate the
assumption of multivariate normality in standard factor analysis. While prior studies have
factor  analyzed  discrete  data,  one  can  calculate  an  appropriate  matrix  of  tetrachoric
correlations,  which  can  be  used  as  an  input  into  factor  analysis.  Tetrachoric  correlation
analysis  essentially  uses  data  in  2x2  contingency  matrices  to  arrive  at  estimates  of  the
Pearson  correlations  that  one  would  obtain  had  the  variables  been  continuous,  bivariate
normal, and linearly related (e.g., Drasgow, 1988). Specifically, if a, b, c, and d represent the
number of observations in the cells of a 2x2 contingency matrix, and x1 and x2 represent
latent  variables  defining  a  two-dimensional  space,  then  the  tetrachoric  correlation  is  the
correlation r that satisfies:
[4]  
where N is the total number of observations, ø(x1,x2,r) is the bivariate normal p.d.f., and z1
and z2 are the cutoff values that divide the two-dimensional space into four quadrants whose
probabilities equal the probabilities in the four cells of the 2x2 matrix (similar equalities are
specified for the relative frequencies     and   ). The tetrachoric correlation can be found
through various approximation techniques, such as the cosine-pi formula, graphic estimates,
or  iterations  using  the  tetrachoric  series  expansion  to  approximate  the  bivariate  normal
integral (see Brown, 1977 for numerical solution techniques). For our application, we used
the POLYCHOR macro (v1.2) in SAS to estimate the matrix of tetrachoric correlations for



















NExplanatory variables. The  first  variable  that  we  included  in  the  multivariate
models to test H1 reflects the strategic importance of the alliance (i.e., Strategic importance).
Respondents  were  asked  to  indicate  on  a  five-point  scale  the  importance  of  gaining
competitive advantage through the collaborative agreement when the alliance contract was
signed. The measure ranged from a value of one for ‘minimal’ to 5 for ‘vital.’ 
Asset specificity, our second theoretical covariate, was constructed as an unweighted
index based on four indicators, each of which were measured on a five-point scale ranging
from  negligible  to  substantial:  “Our  investment  in  dedicated  personnel  specific  to  this
venture is…,” “Our investment in dedicated facilities specific to this venture is…,” “If we
decided to stop this venture, the difficulty we would have in redeploying our people and
facilities presently serving the venture to other uses would be…,” and “If this venture were
to dissolve, our non-recoverable investments in equipment, people, etc. would be…” (e.g.,
Anderson  and  Weitz,  1992;  Parkhe,  1993).  The  Cronbach  alpha  for  this  index  is  0.74,
suggesting that it demonstrates satisfactory reliability (Nunnally, 1978). In an unrestricted
factor analysis, these items loaded on a single factor with an eigenvalue of 2.21 based on the
eigenvalue-greater-than-one criterion, and the factor loadings for the items were 0.75, 0.82,
0.67, and 0.72, respectively. 
Prior ties captures previous collaborative relationships between the two parties. We
measured prior ties as the number of prior alliances between the firms (Gulati, 1995). In
order to examine whether the existence of prior relationships differs in impact from the depth
of prior dealings, we also re-estimated the models with a dummy variable indicating the
presence or absence of prior ties, and the same results were obtained as for the continuous
measure.
The measure used to test our fourth hypothesis is an indicator of whether or not
parties put explicit time bounds on the collaborative agreement. Respondents were asked
whether or not the agreement was meant to last a definite time at the time the contract was
signed. The variable Time bound was coded 1 for contracts that specified a duration to the
alliance, and 0 for contracts for which the duration of the collaboration was open-ended.
Control variables. In order to account for potential confounds to the theoretical
relationships  of  interest,  we  included  three  important  control  variables  into  the  model
specifications. First, we incorporated a control for firm size because for larger firms a given
alliance  may  be  less  relevant  to  the  firm’s  strategy  and  the  investments  made  more
redeployable  to  other  operations  (i.e.,  Firm size).  Moreover,  smaller  firms  may  lack  the
experience,  slack  resources,  or  staff  to  craft  more  sophisticated  alliance  agreements.
Respondents were asked to indicate the number of employees in their firm on a 7-point
scale. Second, we included a control for cross-border alliances for several reasons. There
may  be  enforceability  concerns  or  legal  barriers  to  negotiating  specific  provisions  into
international alliances. However, less information tends to be known about foreign firms
than domestic firms, character-based trust tends to emerge between firms that are socially
similar  (Zucker,  1986),  and  behavioral  uncertainty  is  apt  to  be  greater  for  cross-border
alliances.  The  variable  Foreign assumes  a  value  of  1  if  the  partners  are  from  different
countries, and 0 otherwise. Finally, we introduced a control to indicate whether the alliance
was a nonequity or equity agreement since firms may alter the fundamental governance
structure of an alliance in response to exchange hazards rather than only tailor a contract
(e.g.,  Chi,  1994;  Hennart,  1988).  Introduction  of  this  control  also  helps  to  account  for
unobserved transactional attributes and deal with the possibility that some provisions may be
better suited to the establishment of a separate business entity or to a purely contractual
interface  between  firms.  Equity takes  on  a  value  of  1  for  equity  alliances,  and  0  for
nonequity, or purely contractual, agreements.
10Results
Figure  1  presents  the  distribution  of  the  unweighted  measure  of  contractual
completeness. The mean number of provisions put into alliance contracts is 3.7, or slightly
less than half of the eight types of provisions in the survey. The figure also indicates that the
modal number of contractual provisions is five, and approximately eleven and eight percent
of  firms  have  either  zero  or  all  of  the  provisions  in  their  contracts,  respectively.  The
relatively uniform distribution of the provisions highlights the heterogeneity of alliances’
contractual forms.
Figure 1. Distribution of Contractual Provisionsa
Table  1  provides  the  relative  frequencies  for  each  of  the  individual  contractual
provisions. It also presents Chi-square tests and two-sample t-tests to examine whether the
proportions  of  contractual  provisions  employed  by  firms  or  the  global  measures  of
contractual  completeness  vary  systematically  across  nonequity  and  equity  alliances.  The
most used provision is arbitration clauses (55%), followed by termination clauses (53%), and
the  least  used  provision  concerns  lawsuits  between  the  parties  (30%).  With  only  one
exception, the usage of these individual contractual provisions does not vary across equity
and nonequity alliances. However, firms tend to negotiate auditing rights into contracts in 82
percent of the equity alliances, whereas their usage drops to only 26 percent for nonequity
alliances (p<0.001). This is consistent with the establishment of a separate business entity in
the case of equity alliances and the lesser need for monitoring and control in alliances reliant
























aN=88.Table 1. Relative Frequencies of Specific Contractual Provisions
bN=88. † p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
The relatively uniform and frequent utilization of the eight contractual provisions
by firms engaged in interfirm cooperation also suggests the possibility that the individual
provisions might often be bundled. Table 2 provides relative frequencies of the contractual
provisions, conditional upon the focal provision listed in the first column appearing in the
alliance contract. Given differences in the usage of the various contractual provisions, the
table also indicates asymmetries in the matrix. In other words, the relative frequency of
provision i given that provision j is in the contract often differs from the relative frequency
of provision j given that provision i is in the contract. In the last column, the table indicates
the mean unweighted count of the provisions (not including the focal provision) when a
particular  provision  appears  in  an  alliance  contract.  This  value  provides  an  indicator  of
overall contractual completeness when the focal provision is in place. 
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Provision Total Nonequity Equity χ 2 t value
1. Rights to reports of relevant transactions 0.49 0.46 0.53 0.38
2. Notification rights for departures from the agreement 0.45 0.44 0.47 0.10
3. Auditing rights 0.50 0.26 0.82 26.28***
4. Confidentiality provisions 0.45 0.50 0.39 0.96
5. Restrictions on proprietary information 0.42 0.40 0.45 0.20
6. Termination provisions 0.53 0.58 0.47 0.98
7. Arbitration clauses 0.55 0.52 0.57 0.30
8. Lawsuit provisions 0.30 0.30 0.29 0.01
Contractual completeness (weighted) 0.45 0.43 0.47 –0.50
Contractual completeness (unweighted) 3.69 3.46 4.00 –1.04























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1Examining each of the columns for maximum and minimum values provides an
indication of when a contractual provision tends to be used together with, or separate from,
other  provisions.  For  example,  the  relative  frequency  of  provision  four  –  confidentiality
provisions – is as high as 84 percent when restrictions are placed on proprietary information
(for example, provision five) and as low as 50 percent when parties make commitments
concerning  auditing  rights  (for  example,  provision  three).  The  fact  that  the  conditional
relative frequencies in all of the columns are greater than the relative frequencies appearing in
Table 1 is suggestive of complementarities among the various contractual provisions.
The data patterns largely confirm the increasing order of stringency of the eight
contractual provisions (Parkhe, 1993) if one assumes that firms tend to add contractual items
in increasing order of stringency. For example, the usage of the first provision – rights of
reports of relevant transactions – is above the mean of 0.46. Conditional upon this provision
being used, the mean unweighted count of 3.58 is below the average of 4.31, indicating that
contracts  tend  to  be  less  complete  when  this  provision  appears  in  alliance  agreements.
Moving toward the opposite extreme, the eighth provision – lawsuit provisions – occurs
much less frequently (29.5%), but when it is used, alliance contracts tend to be significantly
more complex, as demonstrated by the mean unweighted count of 5.31 (versus an average of
4.31). If the mean unweighted counts are rank-ordered and compared with the ordering of
the contractual provisions as presented in the table, the Spearman rank correlation coefficient
is 0.69 (p<0.001). The most notable exception to this rank ordering is the provision for
alliance  termination.  This  provision  appears  in  alliance  contracts  relatively  frequently
(53.4%), but when it appears alliance contracts are comparatively less complex, as indicated
by the mean unweighted count of 4.02.
In order to explore further the bundling of contractual provisions in collaborative
agreements  as  well  as  the  dimensionality  of  the  contractual  completeness  construct,  we
factor analyzed the matrix of tetrachoric correlations for the eight indicators of contractual
provisions (see Table 3). The matrix at the top of the table indicates that the contractual
provisions  that  are  most  related  are  restrictions  on  proprietary  information  and
confidentiality provisions (ρ =0.86, p<0.001) and provisions for termination and arbitration
(ρ =0.73, p<0.001). The contractual provisions that are least related include rights to reports
of relevant transactions and termination provisions (ρ =0.002, n.s.) and rights to reports of
relevant transactions and restrictions on proprietary information ρ =0.07, n.s.). 
14Table 3. Exploratory Factor Analysis of Tetrachoric Correlationsc 
Correlation Matrix
Varimax Rotated Factor Pattern
cN=88. † p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Bold print indicates the largest factor loading for each
contractual provision.
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Provision (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1. Rights to reports of relevant transactions 1
2. Notification rights for departures from the agreement 0.18 * 1
3. Auditing rights 0.32 ** 0.48 *** 1
4. Confidentiality provisions 0.18 * 0.47 *** 0.14 † 1
5. Restrictions on propietary information 0.07 0.40 *** 0.32 ** 0.86 *** 1
6. Termination provisions 0.00 0.20 * 0.18 * 0.59 ** 0.57 ** 1
7. Arbitration clauses 0.18 * 0.30 ** 0.54 ** 0.56 *** 0.72 *** 0.73 *** 1
8. Lawsuit provisions 0.27 ** 0.56 *** 0.56 *** 0.63 *** 0.62 *** 0.57 *** 0.71 ***
Provision Factor One Factor Two Communalities
1. Rights to reports of relevant transactions –0.07 0.69 0.49
2. Notification rights for departures from the agreement 0.33 0.63 0.51
3. Auditing rights 0.21 0.82 0.71
4. Confidentiality provisions 0.85 0.15 0.75
5. Restrictions on proprietary information 0.89 0.15 0.81
6. Termination provisions 0.85 -0.03 0.72
7. Arbitration clauses 0.80 0.34 0.76
8. Lawsuit provisions 0.70 0.55 0.79
Eigenvalue 3.52 2.01
Percent of Variance 43.98 25.07
Cumulative Percent of Variance 43.98 69.05The  bottom  portion  of  the  table  provides  the  results  of  a  principal  components
factor  analysis  after  varimax  rotation.  Factors  were  retained  if  their  corresponding
eigenvalues  exceeded  one.  Together,  the  two  factors  that  were  retained  explained  69.1
percent  of  the  variance  in  the  data.  Communalities  generally  exceeded  0.50,  with  the
exception of the first provision – rights to reports of relevant transactions – which had a
communality of 0.49, indicating that the two factors capture a significant portion of the
variance in each of the eight indicators. 
Although the interpretation and labeling of factors is subjective and a matter of
judgment, there are two noteworthy findings from this analysis. First, the provisions load on
the  two  factors  in  accordance  with  their  order  of  stringency.  The  first  three  contractual
provisions load on a distinct factor, and the last five contractual provisions load on a separate
factor. None of the provisions load in a manner inconsistent with their ranked stringency.
This observation is consistent with prior findings on the bundling of contractual provisions
and the relationship between contractual completeness and the presumed stringency of the
various provisions. 
Second, the two factors are discernible as they deal with rather different aspects of
alliance governance. In the case of the first factor, provisions loading highly on this factor
are concerned with confidentiality, proprietary information, alliance termination, arbitration,
and lawsuits. We labeled this factor extra-alliance commitments since these variables deal
with the use of information outside of the scope of the alliance and concern the ending of the
collaborative agreement and the use of outside parties to resolve disputes. The second factor,
by contrast, relates more closely to the management of the collaborative agreement per se.
Variables loading highly on this factor include rights of reports for relevant transactions,
notification rights for departures from the agreement, and auditing rights. Hence, in order to
reflect the more direct linkage between this factor and on-going alliance management, we
labeled this factor monitoring and control.
Table  4  presents  descriptive  statistics  and  a  correlation  matrix  for  the  variables
comprising the multivariate models. The average number of prior alliances between partners
was 0.52, and the number of prior collaborative agreements ranged from zero to twelve. 19.8
percent  of  the  firms  had  a  prior  alliance  with  each  other.  The  majority  of  the  sampled
alliances  were  cross-border  collaborations  (for  example,  85%),  and  firms  rated
collaborations  with  foreign  partners  as  being  strategically  more  important  than  domestic
collaborations (p<0.01). Roughly half of the collaborative agreements were equity alliances
(for example, 43%), and roughly half of the sample alliances had a pre-specified duration (for
example, 47%). Of those alliances that were time-bound, the average specified duration was
4.9 years. Consistent with prior treatments of equity and nonequity alliances as alternative
governance arrangements for hybrid organizational forms (e.g., Oxley, 1997; Pisano, 1989),
equity-based alliances were used over nonequity collaborations when firms made transaction-
specific investments to the alliance (p<0.01). There is also evidence that smaller firms tend to
make less redeployable commitments to their alliances than larger firms (p<0.01). 
16Table 4. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrixd
dN=88. † p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
Table  5  presents  the  results  of  the  multivariate  analyses.  Models  1  and  2  are
estimated  using  order  logit  since  the  dependent  variable,  Contractual  completeness
(unweighted), is discrete (for example, as given by Equation 3 above). Models 3 and 4 rely
on the weighted measure of contractual completeness (for example, as given by Equation 2
above), and are therefore estimated using OLS. In contrast to Models 1-4, which examine
contractual completeness using aggregate analyses, the remaining models examine specific
dimensions of contractual completeness, as determined by the exploratory factor analysis.
Models 5 and 6 consider antecedents of extra-alliance commitments, using the scores from
factor one discussed above. Similarly, Models 7 and 8 assess the determinants of monitoring
and control by using the factor scores from factor two as dependent variables. Models 1, 3,
5, and 7 serve as baseline models by incorporating control variables alone. Models 2, 4, 6,
and 8 augment the baseline models with the theoretical covariates. A likelihood ratio test
indicates  the  joint  significance  of  these  theoretical  variables  in  Model  2  (p<0.01),  and
hierarchical F-tests reveal that the four theoretical variables are jointly significant in Models
4 (p<0.01), 6 (p<0.001), and 8 (p<0.05). 
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Variable Mean S.D. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1. Contractual completeness 3.69 2.41
(unweighted)
2. Contractual completeness 0.45 0.33 0.97 ***
(weighted)
3. Strategic importance 3.54 0.76 0.39 *** 0.38 ***
4. Asset specificity 9.07 3.37 0.30 * 0.27 * 0.15
5. Prior ties 0.52 1.83 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.08
6. Time bound 0.47 0.50 0.14 0.18 0.01 0.01 –0.01
7. Firm size 4.47 2.08 0.05 0.06 –0.19 –0.33 ** 0.17 0.03
8. Foreign 0.85 0.36 0.23 † 0.21 † 0.36 ** 0.02 –0.09 –0.03 0.11
9. Equity 0.43 0.50 0.11 0.06 –0.08 0.30 ** 0.12 –0.11 –0.05 –0.12Table 5. Estimation Results from Multivariate Analysese
eN=88. † p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
Our first hypothesis predicted that a firm will negotiate more contractual provisions
and  more  stringent  provisions  into  alliances  that  are  strategically  important  to  the  firm.
Consistent with this prediction, the results in Models 2 and 4 demonstrate that the greater
the strategic importance of an alliance, the more complex the alliance contract in terms of
the number  and  stringency  of  contractual  provisions  (both  p<0.01).  The  diminished
significance of the indicator for whether the alliance was cross-border or purely domestic, as
well  as  the  significant  correlation  between  this  variable  and  the  alliance’s  strategic
importance, also indicates that strategic importance, rather than partner identity per se, is
more relevant as a factor influencing the design of alliance contracts.
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Aggregate Analyses Disaggregate Analyses
Contractual Contractual Extra-alliance Monitoring
completeness completeness commitments and control
(unweighted) (weighted) (Factor 1) (Factor 2)
Independent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Intercept(s) Incl. Incl. 0.25* –0.56 * –0.28 –2.35 * –0.70 * –1.73 **
(0.12) (0.22) (0.32) (0.56) (0.30) (0.63)
Firm size 0.02 0.15 0.01 0.03 † 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.08 †
(0.10) (0.11) (0.02) (0.01) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Foreign 1.26 * 0.59 0.18† 0.04 0.39 0.06 0.28 0.08
(0.58) (0.63) (0.10) (0.10) (0.26) (0.25) (0.25) (0.26)
Equity 0.56 0.40 0.05 0.02 –0.18 –0.23 0.69 *** 0.58 **
(0.43) (0.43) (0-08) (0.07) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.18)
Strategic importance 0.85 ** 0.15 ** 0.41 ** 0.22
(0.33) (0.05) (0.13) (0.14)
Asset specificity 0.14 * 0.03 * 0.05 † 0.04
(0.07) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
Prior ties –0.00 –0.00 0.02 –0.13 *
(0.11) (0.02) (0.05) (0.06)
Time bound 0.51 0.11 0.46 * –0.40 *
(0.43) (0.06) (0.18) (0.18)
5.39 20.31 **
14.92 **
1.18 3.31 ** 1.19 3.98 ** 4.86 ** 4.36 **
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∆The second hypothesis suggested that alliances will be contractually more complete
when firms make alliance commitments that are less redeployable without significant loss in
value. The results in Models 2 and 4 provide support for this prediction. The greater the
transaction-specific  investment  in  an  alliance,  the  greater  the  number  and  stringency  of
contractual provisions built into the alliance contract (both p<0.05). Alliances with more
general purpose assets, however, tend to rely on fewer contractual provisions.
The  remaining  hypotheses  considered  the  roles  of  partners’  prior  ties  and  their
specification of a duration for the alliance. Neither of these hypotheses received support in
the  aggregate  analyses.  However,  the  significance  of  these  variables  in  the  disaggregate
analyses  presented  in  Models  6  and  8  suggests  that  the  more  aggregate  treatments  of
contractual  completeness  mask  the  actual  influence  of  these  variables.  Specifically,  prior
alliances between firms leads them to specify fewer provisions relating to monitoring and
control (p<0.05 in Model 8), but has no bearing on the commitments firms make to each
other  in  terms  of  the  usage  of  proprietary  information,  the  provisions  made  for  alliance
termination, and the reliance on third parties to adjudicate disputes. Moreover, the results
show how the effects of time bounds on collaborative agreements hinge upon the dimension
of  contractual  completeness  considered.  Consistent  with  the  predictions  of  H4,  alliance
agreements with specified durations will tend to rely more heavily on provisions dealing with
proprietary  information,  termination,  and  dispute  resolution  (p<0.05).  However,  it  is  also
apparent  that  the  specification  of  durations  for  strategic  alliances  lessens  the  usage  of
contractual provisions for monitoring and control (p<0.05 in Model 8). The findings for the
control  variables  confirm  the  bivariate  result  that  such  provisions  also  tend  to  be  more
relevant  for  equity  alliances  involving  a  business  entity  rather  than  a  purely  contractual
interface between collaborators.
Discussion
Our  findings  underscore  the  importance  of  contractual  heterogeneity  in  strategic
alliances. The complexity of alliance contracts varies greatly across collaborative agreements,
and  contractual  completeness  is  not  captured  by  the  equity/nonequity  dichotomy  that
distinguishes the discrete governance arrangements that firms use for alliances. For seven out
of the eight contractual provisions studied, significant differences in usage are not observed
across equity alliances and nonequity alliances. Only auditing rights are systematically used
more frequently in equity alliances. 
More  importantly,  our  results  suggest  that  alliance  governance  structures  and
contractual forms have unique determinants. Transaction-specific investment influences both
the governance structures that firms choose as well as the contractual provisions that they put
in place in their alliance agreements. This finding is in accord with prior research examining
alternative types of contracts (e.g., Joskow, 1988). Prior research has also found that previous
collaborative relationships between firms affect alliance governance (Gulati, 1995), and we
report that such prior ties also influence the contractual provisions that firms institute into
their  alliances.  However,  we  also  note  that  the  strategic  importance  of  alliances  and  the
potential time-bounds that firms place on their collaborative agreements influence alliances’
contractual designs, but these variables are not related to the governance structures firms
select for their alliances. These results challenge prior thinking on alliances that tends to
equate governance structures with contractual forms.
19Our analysis is responsive to Poppo and Zenger’s (2002) call for research on the
specific types of clauses managers institute into contracts rather than relying upon global
measures of contractual completeness. By examining eight types of contractual provisions
that can also be combined into an overall measure of contractual completeness, the study first
examined the implications of alternative weighting schemes for the stringency of provisions.
In our assessment of the bundling of contractual provisions and the completeness of alliance
contracts  when  firms  use  particular  provisions,  we  validated  prior  orderings  for  the
stringency of the eight provisions (Parkhe, 1993). However, the stringency-weighted index
and  the  unweighted  index  of  contractual  completeness  are  highly  correlated  (ρ =0.97,
p<0.0001)  and  therefore  yield  equivalent  results  in  multivariate  models  of  alliances’
contractual forms. This suggests that weights for stringency do not provide new information
in models for alliance contracts.
By examining the eight different types of contractual provisions, we were also able
to explore the dimensionality of the contractual completeness construct. Prior research has
tended to assess contractual completeness by relying on either very aggregate measures of
contractual complexity or by examining individual contractual clauses. The results of our
factor analysis of tetrachoric correlations among the eight provisions highlight the relevance
of  an  intermediate  approach.  This  analysis  suggests  that  neither  is  the  contractual
completeness construct unidimensional nor are many indicators of specific clauses required.
Rather,  the  analysis  uncovered  two  distinct  dimensions  to  the  contractual  completeness
construct. One factor consists of provisions dealing with firms’ rights and commitments to
one another before and after the alliance is in operation as well as with their usage of third
parties  to  resolve  disputes.  The  second  factor  comprises  provisions  concerning  the
monitoring and control of the alliance during its operation.
Although the multivariate results do not hinge upon the weighting scheme adopted,
they do depend upon the dimensionality of the contractual completeness construct. When
using  global  measures  of  contractual  completeness  (i.e.,  either  stringency-weighted  or
unweighted), we found that prior collaborative relationships and time bounds on the alliance
have no apparent bearing on the contractual designs firms select for their alliances. However,
more  disaggregated  analyses  indicate  that  the  effects  of  these  variables  are  masked  by
treating contractual completeness as a unidimensional construct.  
More specifically, we find that prior collaborative relationships between partners
reduce the usage of provisions designed to facilitate the monitoring and control of a future
alliance. This result is consistent with the view that prior relationships between firms can
enhance trust as well as develop interorganizational routines. However, prior alliances have
no  effect  on  the  institution  of  provisions  relating  to  confidential  information,  proprietary
technology, termination of the alliance, and reliance on third parties to adjudicate disputes. If
trust tends to be lacking for alliances between new exchange partners and more developed for
alliances between familiar partners, it is surprising that new exchange parties are no more
likely  to  put  such  safeguards  into  their  alliance  agreements.  This  might  reflect  lower
contracting  costs  for  parties  with  prior  alliances  or  the  possibility  that  firms  refine  their
contractual  arrangements  as  trust  develops  (e.g.,  Poppo  &  Zenger,  2002).  Because  the
measure  for  prior  collaborative  relationships  captures  the  effects  of  trust  as  well  as
interorganizational routines, it would be desirable in future research to obtain more direct
measures for these constructs coming from different theoretical traditions.
As  an  additional  indication  of  the  relevance  of  contractual  completeness  as  a
multidimensional  construct,  we  found  that  time-bound  alliances  are  more  likely  to  be
supported by some contractual provisions, but not others. Specifically, consistent with H4,
20firms forming time-bound alliances are more likely to craft alliance agreements that include
provisions  for  confidential  information,  proprietary  technology,  the  termination  of  the
alliance, and dispute resolution by third parties than are firms forging open-ended alliances.
Because  these  provisions  deal  with  what  happens  before  and  after  the  collaborative
agreement is in operation, this result is consistent with managers’ desire to design alliances as
transitional  mechanisms,  the  lack  of  a  shadow  of  the  future  that  exists  in  open-ended
collaborations, and the greater ease of predicting relevant contingencies. However, firms are
less likely to adopt contractual provisions relating to the monitoring and control of alliances
that  have  pre-specified  durations.  This  result  may  reflect  diminished  expectations  for
adjustment cycles or changes in partners’ strategic priorities for time-bound alliances (Doz,
1996; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994; Zajac & Olsen, 1993). 
Beyond  the  research  suggestions  offered  above,  we  see  several  avenues  for
additional work on the contractual heterogeneity of alliances that stem from limitations of the
present  study.  Our  analysis  considers  some  of  the  benefits  of  incorporating  contractual
provisions in alliances, yet equal attention has not been given to contracting costs. One of the
key objectives of firms entering alliances is to enhance their flexibility, so attention could be
given  to  whether  flexibility  losses  or  other  drawbacks  accompany  greater  complexity  in
alliance contracts. Our focus has been on the initial design of alliances by contracting parties,
so additional research is needed on the consequences of these decisions for alliance evolution
and for the outcomes of collaboration. Finally, we have examined eight classes of contractual
provisions that firms can utilize in designing alliances, and extensions could pursue each of
these provisions in considerably more detail since multiple design alternatives are available
for  each  of  the  contractual  provisions.  Research  along  these  lines  will  be  helpful  in
considering alliances as multifaceted contractual forms and in moving beyond taxonomies
such as the equity/nonequity dichotomy in order to capture more of the richness in firms’
alliance design choices.
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